Democrats know they have a problem with working-class voters but don’t agree on the cause. Commentators chalk Kamala Harris’s 2024 loss to high prices, an unusually short campaign cycle, or voter resentment against the possibility of having an African American woman as president. But the Democratic Party’s working-class woes have much deeper roots.
Many voters in key battleground states feel burned by decades of Democrats’ unrealized promises to improve the lives of working people, failure to reign in obscene economic inequality, and support for economically disastrous policies—from NAFTA to the entrance of China to the World Trade Organization—that led to the loss of countless jobs and futures in their states.
A new study from the Center for Working-Class Politics (CWCP), with the Labor Institute and Rutgers University, uses a 3,000-person YouGov survey in Michigan, Wisconsin, Ohio, and Pennsylvania to test whether economic populism—tapping into resentment and insecurity from decades of corporate excess and bipartisan neglect—can win back voters who’ve turned away from the Democratic Party.
Let’s start with the good news. Economic populism is popular among Rust Belt voters—particularly when it explicitly calls out corporate greed and mass layoffs. Strong economic populism—as opposed to “populist-lite” messaging that acknowledges there are few bad apples in the otherwise healthy barrel of large corporations—was particularly popular among many of the groups Democrats have struggled to reach: working-class voters, voters without a four-year college degree, voters whose incomes are less than $50k per year, and Latino voters.
But if economic populism is so popular, why did even the most stalwart Rust Belt economic populists—like former Ohio Senator Sherrod Brown—struggle in 2024? The survey reveals that the Democratic Party label often drags the message underwater. When the very same populist message was delivered by a candidate labeled “Democrat” rather than “Independent,” support dropped by an average of 8.4 points—a gap that balloons into double digits in Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin. In Pennsylvania, by contrast, there’s no meaningful penalty. In races decided by a few points, that brand discount can prove decisive.
Democrats know they have a problem with working-class voters but don’t agree on the cause. Commentators chalk Kamala Harris’s 2024 loss to high prices, an unusually short campaign cycle, or voter resentment against the possibility of having an African American woman as president. But the Democratic Party’s working-class woes have much deeper roots.
Many voters in key battleground states feel burned by decades of Democrats’ unrealized promises to improve the lives of working people, failure to reign in obscene economic inequality, and support for economically disastrous policies—from NAFTA to the entrance of China to the World Trade Organization—that led to the loss of countless jobs and futures in their states.
A new study from the Center for Working-Class Politics (CWCP), with the Labor Institute and Rutgers University, uses a 3,000-person YouGov survey in Michigan, Wisconsin, Ohio, and Pennsylvania to test whether economic populism—tapping into resentment and insecurity from decades of corporate excess and bipartisan neglect—can win back voters who’ve turned away from the Democratic Party.
Let’s start with the good news. Economic populism is popular among Rust Belt voters—particularly when it explicitly calls out corporate greed and mass layoffs. Strong economic populism—as opposed to “populist-lite” messaging that acknowledges there are few bad apples in the otherwise healthy barrel of large corporations—was particularly popular among many of the groups Democrats have struggled to reach: working-class voters, voters without a four-year college degree, voters whose incomes are less than $50k per year, and Latino voters.
But if economic populism is so popular, why did even the most stalwart Rust Belt economic populists—like former Ohio Senator Sherrod Brown—struggle in 2024? The survey reveals that the Democratic Party label often drags the message underwater. When the very same populist message was delivered by a candidate labeled “Democrat” rather than “Independent,” support dropped by an average of 8.4 points—a gap that balloons into double digits in Michigan, Ohio, and Wisconsin. In Pennsylvania, by contrast, there’s no meaningful penalty. In races decided by a few points, that brand discount can prove decisive.
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