This article was produced by Human Bridges, a project of the Independent Media Institute. The material for this paper is derived from “The Distribution of Power and Inclusiveness Across Deep Time” by Gary M. Feinman, David Stasavage, David M. Carballo, Sarah B. Barber, Adam Green, Jacob Holland-Lulewicz, Dan Lawrence, Jessica Munson, Linda M. Nicholas, Francesca Fulminante, Sarah Klassen, Keith W. Kintigh, and John Douglass. (Science Advances, March 18, 2025.) Gary M. Feinman is an archaeologist and the MacArthur curator of anthropology at the Field Museum of Natural History in Chicago.
When we think of pre-modern governance, we often default to an image of concentrated authority: imposing rulers presiding over intricately layered hierarchies—pharaohs, emperors, and kings whose power seemed inseparable from the territorial and demographic scale of the states they commanded. This imagery reinforces a widely held assumption in both scholarship and popular discourse: as societies grow larger and more complex, political authority naturally centralizes, producing autocrats whose power is both extensive and entrenched.
Yet the comparative evidence from the ancient world does not support this deterministic narrative. A new cross-cultural study of 31 pre-modern societies, published in Science Advances, complicates the presumed linkage between scale and autocracy. The research demonstrates that population size alone does not explain the degree to which elites consolidate authority. Instead, it highlights the decisive role of fiscal foundations—specifically, whether governance is financed through broad-based internal taxation or through external and easily monopolized revenue streams such as mineral wealth, long-distance trade, coerced labor, or warfare.
Scale expands the structural capacity for autocracy—but does not determine the outcome
The study draws on 40 archaeological case studies evaluated through standardized metrics of political hierarchy, bureaucratic organization, and citizen inclusiveness. Across these cases, population scale correlates only weakly with the concentration of power. Larger societies do indeed raise the upper bound—the maximum feasible degree of centralization—but they do not mandate that power be concentrated at that ceiling.
These findings challenge longstanding theoretical models in political science and anthropology that treat autocracy as an almost inevitable corollary of increasing complexity. Instead, the archaeological record reveals numerous large, sophisticated polities that implemented enduring forms of collective or distributed governance.
Teotihuacan in central Mexico, the highland Mesoamerican polity of Tlaxcallan, the Haudenosaunee Confederacy in North America, and the Indus city of Mohenjo Daro all sustained political arrangements in which authority was shared, constrained, or diffused. These were not marginal or isolated societies; they were populous, urbanized, and deeply interconnected within regional systems of exchange and interaction. Their historical trajectories show that scale makes autocracy feasible, but institutions grounded in collective governance can prevent it from taking root.
The fiscal foundations of power: How elites’ sources of finance shape what they can do
If demographic and territorial expansion do not by themselves produce autocratic rule, then what does? The study identifies a consistent pattern across world regions: the structure of a society’s revenue base is a powerful predictor of its political form.
In cases where states relied primarily on internal taxation—levies on households, land, markets, or internal trade—rulers depended on the cooperation of their constituents. That dependence generated pressures ensuring negotiation, transparency, and accountability. Fiscal systems rooted in broad participation created political incentives that limited the autonomy of the elite.
Conversely, when elites commanded external or highly concentrated sources of revenue—control over mines and monopolistic oversight of long-distance trade, slave plantations, or the spoils of warfare—they faced no comparable need for public consent. Independent access to wealth insulated them from local constituencies and weakened institutional checks that would otherwise constrain the exercise of power. With fewer fiscal obligations came fewer political obligations.
This relationship between revenue structure and political authority is not merely a feature of the ancient world. It reflects a durable principle of political economy: the narrower the fiscal base, the greater the potential for autocratic consolidation; the broader the fiscal base, the more likely governance will remain representative.
Institutional architecture and the maintenance of collective governance
The study also highlights the institutional mechanisms that allowed collective political systems to endure even at a substantial scale. Societies that resisted autocratic drift frequently developed meritocratic bureaucracies rather than patrimonial ones, emphasizing competence over personal loyalty. Their ceremonial life placed communal participation above elite spectacle. Administrative functions were spatially distributed rather than concentrated in a single monumental seat of power.
These organizational choices left visible material signatures—in settlement plans, public architecture, and the spatial distribution of administrative and ritual spaces. They reveal political strategies designed deliberately to diffuse authority and mitigate the risks of centralization.
Why these patterns matter for contemporary governance
The historical patterns identified in the study resonate strongly with present-day concerns. Modern states that draw heavily on concentrated or external revenue—petro-states, oligarchic extractive economies, and governments funded primarily through customs or administratively insulated trade flows—frequently confront challenges to maintaining democratic accountability. When governments do not depend on citizens for fiscal support, they often do not require citizens for political legitimacy.
Ancient examples mirror these contemporary dynamics. Autocracy commonly crystallized in societies where elites controlled lucrative trade corridors, mineral resources, or imperial plunder. Meanwhile, in cases where revenue flowed through broad-based internal taxation, governance tended to remain more participatory and constrained—regardless of the overall scale of the polity.
The implication is stark: democracy is not only a constitutional or ideological arrangement; it is fundamentally a fiscal one. A broad and inclusive tax base strengthens shared governance, while its erosion creates the conditions under which autocratic power can flourish.
Rethinking democracy’s origins—and its future
This research challenges the notion that inclusive governance is an exceptional or culturally narrow development. The archaeological record demonstrates that societies across the globe repeatedly devised political systems that were negotiated, accountable, and resistant to the concentration of authority. Complexity does not determine political form; fiscal structure, institutional design, and collective choice do.
Understanding this deeper history widens our conception of political possibility. It reminds us that democracy has emerged through multiple pathways and has sustained under diverse historical conditions—and that its durability has depended not just on shared norms or formal institutions, but on the fiscal systems that underwrite them.
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