Originally published in Hankyoreh.
The Kremlin can count on only one real ally in its war in Ukraine. Belarus has offered its territory for the staging of the war, and China has provided some dual-use exports that certainly contribute to the war effort. But only one country has sent a significant number of troops to fight alongside the Russians: North Korea.
Today, about 10,000 North Korean combat troops are stationed in Kursk—along with another 1,000 engineer troops—to protect this western-most city from another Ukrainian incursion and to free up Russian troops to participate in offensive operations inside Ukraine. Another 6,000 North Korean soldiers were killed or injured in previous fighting.
Earlier this year, North Korean leader Kim Jong Un cut a ribbon on a new housing district dedicated to the families of those killed in the Russian war in Ukraine. Recently, at the inauguration of a memorial in Pyongyang to the fallen, Kim celebrated a “new history of friendship with Russia written in blood.” North Korea’s relationship with China was previously celebrated to be “as close as lips and teeth.” But blood goes deeper still.
North Korea also continues to supply Russia with millions of rounds of ammunition—artillery shells, anti-tank rockets, and short-range ballistic missiles. According to Ukrainian estimates, this has amounted to as much as half of what Russian is using in its war. North Korea is certainly supplying quantity, but it’s not necessarily quality. In 2024, one Ukrainian military official estimated that half of the shells North Korea was supplying were duds. No matter: as Russia’s use of its own soldiers as cannon fodder suggests, the Kremlin prefers quantity over quality.
It is telling that Russia, at its time of need, must rely on a country as poor and isolated as North Korea. But what other choices does Russia have?
Some Russian allies have disappeared, like the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, or have been coopted by the United States, like the government of Delcy Rodriguez in Venezuela. Other allies haven’t been able to count on Russia, so they haven’t been able to offer much in turn. Iran, for instance, has been receiving some intelligence from the Kremlin during its war with the United States and Israel. But aside from some drones, Russia hasn’t sent its ally significant hardware much less Russian warships full of soldiers.
Russia is at the center of the Collective Security Treaty Organization—a post-Soviet alliance that also includes Armenia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan—but the group has provided little in the way of assistance even though the CSTO has a mutual defense clause comparable to NATO’s Article Five. It’s no surprise that none of these countries has sent troops to assist in Russia’s war. After all, Russia didn’t come to Armenia’s aid when Azerbaijan took over Nagorno-Karabakh in 2023. Armenia has boycotted meetings of the organization ever since.
It’s not as if Russia lacks ways of enticing potential allies. Russian fossil fuel exports have become especially attractive as the war with Iran has bottled up other supplies in the Strait of Hormuz. But these exports have been monopolized by China and India, which have been taking in about 80 percent of Russia’s oil. Also, drone attacks by Ukraine have reduced Russia’s capacity to export its fossil fuels.
Russia also supplies the world with military hardware. In 2024, it fell to third place in arms exports behind the United States and France, largely because of the requirements of the war in Ukraine. Recently, however, the Kremlin has claimed that it has bounced back by exporting $15 billion worth of weapons in 2025, mostly to Africa and the Middle East. This is still a far cry from U.S. military exports of over $330 billion. But it suggests that Russia is trying to profit in some way from its otherwise disastrous war in Ukraine.
India and Russia have a new military pact, which allows them to station troops, warships, and fighter jets in each other’s countries. This agreement provides Russia with important access to the Indian Ocean. But it doesn’t mean Indian troops are heading to Ukraine. In fact, the only Indians who have fought on behalf of Russia have been tricked into doing so by the Kremlin. And one of the reasons why Russian military exports experienced such a major drop even before the war in Ukraine began is that clients like India have diversified their imports away from dependency on the Kremlin.
China’s assistance to Russia has been more complicated. In addition to the energy purchases, China is helping Russia by providing up to 90 percent of the country’s high-tech needs. Shut out of U.S. and European markets, Russia relies on China for components for drones, machine tools, batteries, fiberoptic systems.
But China is not providing Russia with enough to tip the balance of the war in its favor. Russia, like North Korea, remains something of a liability for China. While Pyongyang is unreliable because of its nuclear program and cyberoperations, Russia is unreliable in its willingness to upend international law in the pursuit of its territorial ambitions.
China, above all, wants stability. And it wants to maintain good relations with the West. The unpredictable actions of Russia and North Korea threaten the global infrastructure that contributes to Chinese growth and prosperity.
This, then, is what unites Russia and North Korea. They are both disgusted with the West, with liberalism, and with any aspect of international law that constrains their freedom of movement, whether it’s human rights conventions or rules governing maritime commerce.
This is something relatively new for Russia. Under Putin, Russia initially flirted with the United States and established a solid energy relationship with Europe. Now, under Western sanctions, it has become a great deal more like North Korea: solidly military-first, increasingly authoritarian and repressive, economically autarkic, and suspicious of technologies, like Telegram, that might magnify civic discontent.
The current reign of Donald Trump, an American leader who favors autocrats over democrats, might indicate that this Russian-North Korean model of governance is on the upswing.
But even Trump’s apparent affection for both Putin and Kim can’t make up for the fact that the economies of North Korea and Russia are struggling, their respective personality cults are showing some cracks, and the war in Ukraine is not currently going in their favor, with Russia losing territory to Ukraine in April for the first time since 2024.
Russia and North Korea are moving ever closer to each other largely because they don’t have a lot of choice in the matter. Even blood oaths can’t make up the fact that their alliance is one of desperation, not inspiration
COMMENTS